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ON THE CHOICE BETWEEN
PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY *
Whenparties can bargain with each other in an externality
situation, it is frequently argued that liability rules are prefera-
ble to property rules. The case for liability rules is thought to
be strongest when the parties behave strategically, when the
collective authority responsible for maximizing social welfare
has perfect information, and when lump-sum transfers are not
available. It is shown here that liability rules are not generally
preferable to property rules in these circunf$tances because of
their limited ability to redistribute income between the parties.
In many externality situations the parties in conflict are able to bar-
gain with each other. When there are very few individuals involved, this
possibility arises naturally. When the number of parties is large, bargain-
ing often can occur because the relevant individuals —victimsor injurers
—mightselect a representative to bargain on their behalf, or might have
one imposed on them. For example, industry associations, class action
law suits, and neighborhood groups all facilitate bargaining solutions to
externality problems in the large number case.
As in any bargaining game, there must be rules governing permissible
moves and threats. Two kinds of rules have been suggested.' Under both,
some outcome —calledthe entitlement point —ischosen initially by a
collective authority as the point from which bargaining will proceed. A
property rule gives each party the right to block any deviation from the
entitlement point without that party's consent. A liability rule gives each
party the right to compensation from the other party for the damages
suffered as a result of the other party's deviation from the entitlement
point. What distinguishes the liability rule is that the amount of compen-
sation is determined by the collective authority, rather than by negotia-
tion between the parties.
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I. The now classic statement of the rules to be considered here is b Calabresi and Melamed
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the present paper in notes 6 and 14 below,) See also the Organisation for Economic Co-operation




Under certain conditions, an apparently convincing case can be made
for using liability rules rather than property rules.2 These conditions are
that the parties bargain strategically (in the sense that they fail to reach
all Pareto superior agreements),3 that the collective authority has com-
plete information about the technology of the externality, arid that lump-
sum transfers are not available to redistribute income between the
parties.4 The argument, briefly and loosely stated, follows.
With complete information, the collective authority can, for any
entitlement point, design a schedule of liability which will induce the
relevant party to choose the "efficient" outcome.S Strategic behavior is
circumvented because the other party cannot threaten to block that
choice. Although the schedule of liability must be one iii which marginal
liability equals actual marginal damages at the efficient outcome, infra-
marginal liability may be greater or less than actual damages. By the
appropriate choice of the entitlement point and the liability schedule, it is
claimed that any distributional result can be achieved. Thus, the absence
of lump-sum transfers is overcome.
In contrast, the collective authority can achieve the efficient outcome
using a property rule only by choosing the entitlement point corre-
sponding to this outcome. This is because, given strategic behavior, the
parties would not agree to move all the way to the efficient result from
any other entitlement point. The unique distribution of income implied
by this choice of entitlements cannot be modified by lump-sum transfers.
Only by coincidence would this distribution be the preferred one.
This paper shows that under the stated conditions —strategicbe-
havior, perfect information, and the unavailability of lump-sum transfers
—liabilityrules are not generally superior to property rules. The mistake
in the argument stems from the fact that, for reasons to be explained in a
later section, there is no effective distributional flexibility in the infra-
marginal liability schedule. Specifically, it will be shown that marginal
liability must everywhere equal actual marginal damages. Thus, all of
the "gains from trade" from moving from the entitlement point to the
efficient outcome are obtained by the party subject to the liability rule.
2. Although no one has stated the case as explicitly as it will be described here. it is implicit in
the work of Ellickson (1973, PP. 738-748), Rabin (1977). and the Comment (1978) in the New York
University Law Review.
3. Roughly speaking, strategic behavior occurs because each party underestimates the other
party's willingness to agree to its position.
4. Although these conditions are the ones which are implicit in the conventional case for liability
rules (see note 2 above), it may seem peculiar to assume that the collective authority has complete
information about the externality yet cannot use lump-sum transfers. However, in the institutional
context in which the problem arises, the 'ollective authority is usually a court, which is not em-
powered to engage in general redistribution
5. Either party may be the relevant party, depending on the entitlement point; see section III
below. The "efficient" outcome refers to the outcome which would be desired if lump-sum trans-
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In contrast, under a property rule the gains from trade could be split
between the parties in any way, depending on their relative bargaining
strengths. Thus, depending on the distributional preferences of the
collective authority, the bargaining outcome under the property rule
might be preferable to the outcome under the liability rule. In fact, it will
be shown that the range of outcomes in which a liability rule is unam-
biguously preferable to a property rule may be arbitrarily small.
As the previous discussion indicates, the choice between property rules
and liability rules is interesting only if the collective authority has
preferences regarding the distribution of income between the parties.
Otherwise, given perfect information, the rules are equally desirable
since either one can achieve the efficient outcome. Such distributional
preferences may seem peculiar when there are literally just two parties
involved. However, in practice, many individuals are likely to be affected
by the choice of the rule, either because there are numerous other two-
party situations to which the chosen rule would apply, or, as noted
earlier, one or both "parties" may represent a large class of individuals.
In section 1 the externality problem is described. Sections II and III
analyze the sets of outcomes under property rules and liability rules,
respectively, when there is (actually or effectively) one injurer and one
victim. In section IV the choice between the rules is discussed in this
context. Section V contains a summary of conclusions. An appendix
shows how the analysis is affected by the presence of many victims.
I.THE PROBLEM
Forsimplicity, it is assumed that the externality involves two firms,
an active injurer and a passive victim.6 The injurer's profits are an
increasing (up to a point), strictly concave function of its output and the
victim's damages are a strictly increasing, differentiable function of this
output. The victim's profits are fixed prior to suffering damages, but
there are no fixed profits of the injurer. The injurer's output is assumed
to range between (and include) zero output and its profit-maximizing
output, and the parties' joint profits are assumed to reach a unique maxi-
mum in the interior of this range. Let
q =outputof the injurer,
n(q) =totalprofits of the injurer,
qM= outputat which the injurer's profits are maximized,
6. It is assumed that merger does not take place. Strategic behavior provides one possible ex-
planation. To agree to merge the firms would have to decide how to split the gains from trade
resulting from the joint-profit maximizing behavior of the merged firm. It is also assumed that new
firms cannot enter. To allow for free entry and exit would convert the problem from a "small
number" one to a large number" one in which bargaining would not be practicable. See Frech
(1979) for a discussion of property rules and liability rules in the latter context. (Because injurers and
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6(q)= totaldamages to the victim,
=fixedprofits of the victim (before damages),7
q *= outputat which joint profits are maximized (the "efficient"
output).
Given any output q, the injurer's profits are ir(q) and the victim's
profits are i —d(q).It will be useful to derive the profits of the injurer
as a function of those of the victim, assuming that only the output of the
injurer can be varied and that the parties remain at this output. This
relationship will he called the profit frontier.8 As one would expect, the
injurer's profits are a decreasing function of the victim's profits. It will be
assumed further that this function is strictly concave. A sufficient con-
dition for this is that the victim's marginal damages are constant or
increasing, which is a common assumption in externality analysis.
An example of this externality problem is illustrated in Figure 1 in
terms of the parties' marginal schedules. The corresponding profit
frontier is shown in Figure 2. There is a one-to-one relationship between
points on the profit frontier and outputs of the injurer.
If the collective authority could use lump-sum transfers, it would,
ideally, have the injurer produce at q *andthen redistribute income to
the extent desired. In terms of Figure 2, the set of attainable outcomes
would be represented by a downward sloping 45° line tangent to the
profit frontier at the point on the frontier, f*, corresponding to q .This
will be called the transfer line. The point on this line which maximizes
social welfare, given the collective authority's distributional preferences,
is the first-best solution.
II.PROPERTY RULES
Propertyrules give each party the right to block any movement away
from the entitlement point without that party's consent. By definition, if
7. Itis assumed that W is sufficiently large so that the victim will remain in business regardless
of the injurer's output (over the relevant range). If there were zero-profit opportunities elsewhere, this
would be equivalent to assuming that if d(qM
8. Letx be some level of the victim's profits, so x = W — d(q). Solving for q gives q = d(ff —
where d is the inverse of d. Substituting this into n(q) gives the desired relationship,
= n(d(if — x.
It is easy to show (using the inverse function rule) that
n'—,s'/d'<O, Oq<q.,
and that
sign] = signEss" — IT'd"].
9. In Figure 2 it is assumed for convenience that = d(qM), so that the victim's profits are zero
when the injurer's profits are238 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
the entitlement point does not correspond to the efficient outcome, there
are potential gains from trade. But given strategic behavior, there is no
guarantee that the parties will be able to agree on how to split the gains.
Since each party has the right to remain at the entitlement point, any
deviation from it that does occur must be a Pareto superior change. Thus,
the set of potential outcomes under a property rule is defined by the
entitlement point and consists of all feasible Pareto superior changes from
that point. In general, there are a wide range of possible outcomes,
depending on how close the parties bargain toward the efficient outcome
and how they split the gains from trade.
The potential outcomes under a property rule are easily illustrated in
terms of the externality problem and profit frontier represented by
Figures 1 and 2. Suppose the entitlement point is at qE in Figure 1. There
are potential gains from trade between qE and q *sinceit pays the injurer
to "buy off" the victim to permit increases in the injurer's output. Given
strategic behavior, the parties could end up anywhere in this range and
could split the resulting gains in any way. The point on the profit frontier
corresponding to qEisf. in Figure 2. The vertically hatched area repre-
sents all the potential outcomes under the property rule, given entitlement
point qE. If the parties were to bargain cooperatively, they would end up
at q *inFigure 1. This would correspond to some point on the transfer
line in the region which is Pareto superior to f,, in Figure 2. The exact
point would depend on how the gains from trade were split.
The previous discussion applies to every possible entitlement point.
With one exception, the outcome under a property rule is indeterminate
and, because of strategic behavior, not on the transfer line. The exception
is when the entitlement point 'coincides with the efficient outcome. There
are no potential gains from trade, so the parties remain there.
III.LIABILITY RULES
Liabilityrules give each party the right to compensation from the
other party for the damages suffered as a result of the other party's devia-
tion from the entitlement point. The amount of compensation is deter-
mined by the collective authority. Since what is taken from one party is
given to the other, there are gains from trade if the entitlement point does
not coincide with the efficient outcome. For reasons to be seen, certain
restrictions on the schedule of liability are required to guarantee that
the parties will exploit all of the gains from trade.
The potential outcomes under a liability rule are best illustrated in
terms of the externality problem and profit frontier represented by
Figures 1 and 2. Consider again the entitlement point qE in Figure 1.
Suppose the injurer's marginal liability beyond qE equals the victim's
actual marginal damages, 6'. The injurer would then choose to produce
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for damages between qEandq'. Thus, the victim's profits would be the
same as those at qE and the injurer's profits would be greater than those at
qEbythe gains from trade. Since the injurer produces atq ,theout-
come is somewhere on the transfer line in Figure 2. And since the victim's
profits are the same as those at qE,theoutcome is that point on the
transfer line directly above f in Figures 2. This is point t ("a" for
compensation equal to actual damages).
Suppose, alternatively, that marginal liability beyond qE is less than
actual marginal damages. An example of such a liability schedule is
labeled 1 in Figure 1 ("u" for undercompensation). Again, the injurer
would choose to produce at q *•Butnow the victim would be less than
fully compensated for damages between qEandq ,andthe injurer's
profits would be that much larger. Since the injurer produces at q, the
outcome is still on the transfer line in Figure 2. And since the victim's
profits are lower, it must be northwest of point t. This outcome is repre-
sented by point t, which, for reasons to be explained, must be between
t. andf.
It is easy to see that an even lower liability schedule than I in
Figure 1 would lead to an outcome further up the transfer line than t in
Figure 2. In the "limit," marginal liability could be zero until just before
q (but would then have to rise steeply to d(q*) at q*)•lO Thus, the
best off the injurer could be made and the worst off the victim could be
made corresponds to their profits at q In terms of the transfer line, this,
of course, corresponds to point f* in Figure 2. By the appropriate choice
of a marginal liability schedule which undercompensates the victim,
any point on the transfer line between t and f*the darkened portion
—couldbe achieved.
Finally, suppose that marginal liability beyond qE is greater than
actual marginal damages, but less than the injurer's marginal profits."
An example of such a liability schedule is labeled 1inFigure 1 ("o" for
overcompensation). Although it might appear that the injurer would
again be induced to produce at q , this is not so. Because the victim is
overcompensated, the victim gains by increases in the injurer's output. By
threats to not increase his output, the injurer can attempt to extort some
or all of these benefits, 10— d',from the victim, Of course, if the
threat is carried out, the injurer loses too. But this is the essence of an
extortion situation and, given strategic behavior, there is no guarantee
that the injurer will end up producing at the efficient outcome,q .In
general, the parties could end up at any output between the entitlement
point, qE,andq .
10.itis assumedthatmarginal liability cannot be negative. This assumption is motivated by insti-
tutional considerations. A victim suing an injurer for damages may lose, but his losing never results in
his paying the injurer something (putting aside the issue of reimbursing the injurer for the cost of
defending himself).
ii. If marginal liability were to exceed n', the analysis would be essentially equivalent to the
"limiting" case in which marginal liability equals is'. This case is discussed below.240 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
When marginal liability exceeds actual marginal damages, the poten-
tial outcomes under the liability rule are a subset of the potential out-
comes under the property rule with the same entitlement point. In terms
of the entitlement point qEandthe liability schedule 1 in Figure 1, it is
the subset represented by the horizontally hatched area in Figure 2. The
reasons for this are as follows. Suppose, in terms of Figure 1, the injurer
successfully extorts all of the victim's gains, i —6',no matter what
output the parties end up at. The victim is still fully compensated for his
damages beyond qE (since he would never be willing to pay more than
—6'),sohis profits are the same as those at qE.Theinjurer's profits
increase as a function of q by the gains from trade. It is easy to see that, in
terms of Figure 2, this corresponds to the line f t, the vertical boundary
of the set of property rule outcomes.
Suppose, instead, that when the victim is overcompensated the injurer
fails to extort any of the victim's gains. In these circumstances, both
parties' profits increase monotonically as q goes from q to q ,starting
from their profits at qE.Thesepotential outcomes are represented in
Figure 2 by the positively sloped segment ft0.'2Thissegment terminates
at the transfer line since the parties cannot do better than when the
injurer produces at q .Finally,if the injurer successfully extorts only a
fraction of the victim's gains, the outcome will be represented by some
interior point in the horizontally hatched area.
It is easy to see that an even higher liability schedule than 1 in
Figure 1 would expand the set of potential outcomes under the liability
rule relative to that represented by the horizontally hatched area in
Figure 2. In the "limit," marginal liability could be equal everywhere to
the injurer's marginal profits. In this case, all of the gains from trade
would be subject to extortion and the set of potential outcomes under the
liability rule would be the same as that under the corresponding property
rule.
The previous discussion applies to every entitlement point between
zero and the efficient outcome, q .Thisimplies that there is never an
advantage to using inframarginal liability less than actual marginal
damages in order to redistribute income from the victim to the injurer.
Every outcome achievable in this way can be duplicated by liability
everywhere equal to actual damages and the choice of a different entitle-
ment point. Consider, for example, the liability schedule 1inFigure 1,
which led to point tinFigure 2. From the earlier discussion in this
section, it is clear that the choice of the entitlement point corresponding
to point f on the profit frontier would, with liability equal to actual
damages, also lead to point t. The same observation is true for any other
point on the darkened portion of the transfer line.
The discussion in this section applies as well to entitlement points
12. The curvature of this segment is indeterminate without further assumptions.POLINSKY: PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 241
between the efficient outcome, q ,andthe injurer's profit-maximizing
output, qM.Theonly modification is that the role of the injurer and victim
are reversed. In effect, the victim can choose the injurer's output but
must compensate the injurer for his "damages" —foregoneprofits —
relativeto the entitlement point. This is sometimes called a "reverse"
liability rule. For analogous reasons, there is no advantage to paying the
injurer less than his actual foregone profits; and there are extOrtion oppor-
tunities if the injurer is paid more than his actual losses.
IV.THE CHOICE
Thechoice between property rules and liability rules depends on the
technology of the externality, the distributional preferences of the collec-
tive authority, and the bargaining behavior of the parties. The relevance
of these factors will be discussed in terms of Figure 3 (which shows the
profit frontier for a different externality problem than the one illustrated
in Figure 1).
Given the technology of the externality, there are certain outcomes
achievable by liability rules which are on the transfer line, and which are
therefore Pareto superior to certain property rule outcomes. By setting
laibility (normal or "reverse") everywhere equal to actual damages and
varying the entitlement point from zero to the injurer's profit-maximizing
output, qM,anypoint on the darkened portion of the transfer line can
be achieved. As Figure 3 makes clear, these liability rule outcomes
dominate any outcome achievable by a property rule with entitlements
corresponding to points on the profit frontier betweenf and f. Figure 3
also shows that the segment of the transfer line along which liability rules
are preferable to property rules is determined olely by the technology of
the externality. In general, this segment can range from an arbitrarily
small portion of the transfer line (in the "neighborhood" of f*) to an
arbitrarily large portion of the line.
The remaining outcomes which are not dominated by any liability rule
are defined by the sets of potential property rule outcomes when the
entitlement points are at the two extremes —zerooutput and the in-
jurer's profit-maximizing output, qM.Interms of Figure 3, these entitle-
ment points correspond to points f. and f,,, on the profit frontier, and the
potential outcomes are indicated by the vertically hatched areas. For
each point in these two regions, there does not exist a liability rule out-
come on the transfer line which is Pareto superior to that point.
If the distributional preferences of the collective authority are such
that the first-best solution lies on the portion of the transfer line achiev-
able by a liability rule, then, of course, this liability rule would be pref era-
ble to any property rule. However, there is no reason to believe that this
would occur in general since the authority's distributional preferences




If the first-best solution does not lie on this part of the transfer line,
then the choice between property rules and liability rules depends on the
parties' bargaining behavior —howstrategically they behave and how
they split the gains from trade. This is illustrated in Figure 3 for the case
in which the first-best solution is on the lower part of the transfer line.
It is assumed that the collective authority's distributional preferences can
be represented by (strictly convex) social indifference curves. 13 The curve
which goes through the "best" liability rule outcome on the transfer line
is shown. (This outcome is achieved when the entitlement point cor-
responds to f. —zerooutput —andliability equals actual damages.)
Every outcome in the shaded area is therefore socially preferable to this
liability rule outcome. For every entitlement point corresponding to the
points on the profit frontier between f. andf, a property rule could lead
to an outcome in this preferred area. Whether in fact the property rule
outcome would be more desirable depends on the extent to which the
parties bargain towards the "efficient" outcome, q *,andhow they split
the gains from trade. As Figure 3 shows, however, if the parties do not
split the gains too asymmetrically, there may be a wide range of property
rule outcomes which are socially preferable to the best liability rule out-
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come on the transfer line even though the parties fail to bargain very close
tounder the property rule.
There is one final consideration in the choice between property rules
and liability rules when the first-best solution is not attainable. Even
though a property rule outcome may be preferable to the best liability
rule outcome with liability equal to actual damages. it is necessary to
consider whether a liability rule outcome with liability greater than
actual damages might he even better. It was shown in section III that
one effect of the latter type of liability rule is to limit the set of potential
outcomes relative to the corresponding property rule (see Figure 2). In
general, this effect is not necessarily desirableand may be detrimental
—sincesome of the excluded outcomes are Pareto superior to some of the
remaining outcomes. However, the parties might be more likely to agree
on how to split the gains when there is less scope for bargaining. Another
effect of a liability rule with liability greater than actual damages is to
reverse, relative to a property rule, the roles of the parties in terms of
who does the threatening. For example. when the entitlement point is
between zero output and the efficient output, q ,thevictim does the
threatening under a property rule, whereas the injurer does the threaten-
ing under a liability rule with overcompensation. This effect might point
either way, depending on which party is more stubborn.
V.CONCLUSIONS
Theconclusions of this paper may he summarized as follows:
(1) The first-best solution —socialwelfare maximum —isachievable
only in a (possibly very) restricted set of circumstances determined by the
technology of the externality and the distributional preferences of the
collective authority.
(2) When the first-best solution is feasible, only a liability rule can
achieve it.
(a) Liability must be less than or equal to actual damages to avoid
strategic behavior.
(b) Liability less than actual damages is never advantageous
because the same outcome can be reached with liability equal
to actual damages starting from a different entitlement point.
(3) When the first-best solution is not attainable, there is not a general
case for liability rules or property rules.
'(a) A property rule may be preferred to any liability rule with
liability equal to actual damages if the parties do not bargain
too strategically and if they do not split the gains from trade
too asymmetrically.
(b) A liability rule with liability greater than actual damages may
be preferred to a property rule because it restricts the scope
for bargaining and reverses the roles of the parties with respect
to threats.244 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
It is important to emphasize, finally, that the discussion here has been
in a bargaining setting which is presumably most favorable to choosing
liability rules. In practice, the collective authority —suchas a court —
usuallyhas imperfect information about the technology of the ex-
ternality. This tends to further weaken the case for liability rules.'4
APPENDIX:MANY VICTIMS
Inexternality situations involving a large number of individuals, it is
often not practical to have the group represented by a single party. A
simple variation of the previous discussion can be. used to analyze the
choice between property rules and liability rules in this context. Only
the case of one injurer and many victims will be considered since the
other cases are easily developed from this one. It is assumed, for sim-
plicity, that social welfare is a function of the injurer's profits and the
victims' aggregateprofits.
The outcomes under property rules now correspond to the profit
frontier because, with many victims, no bargaining will take place. II,
in terms of Figure 1, the entitlement point is between zero output and the
efficient output, q*, then bargaining will not occur because each victim
has the power to block the injurer's increase in output and will attempt to
be the "hold out." If the entitlement point is between q *andthe injurer's
profit-maximizing output, qM,thenbargaining will not take place be-
cause each victim will attempt to take a "free ride" on the other victims'
efforts to reduce the injurer's output.
The outcomes under liability rules are also affected by the presence of
many victims. Suppose first that liability is equal to actual damages. (For
the same reason as in section III, there is no advantage to having liability
less than actual damages.) If the entitlement point is less than q ,then
each victim will have an incentive to obtain only his own damages. The
holdout problem is avoided. However, if the entitlement point exceeds
q ,theneach victim will attempt to take a free ride on the other victims'
payments to reduce the injurer's output. As a result, no bargaining will
take place.
Now suppose that liability exceeds actual damages for each victim.
If the entitlement point is less than q ,theinjurer would not have an
14. For a detailed comparison of property rules and liability rules (and Pigovian taxes) when
the government has imperfect information, see Polinsky (1979). Although that paper also briefly
considered property and liability rules when the government has perfect information, it did so
under a different set of assumptions than the ones used here and came to very different conclusions.
Specifically, it was assumed that entitlements are exogenous (for example, determined by considera-
tions of justice), rather than policy instruments to be chosen. Accordingly, the distributional goals of
the government were assumed to take the special form of guaranteeing each party the prolits it
would have at the entitlement point. It was also taken for granted that liability was set everywhere
equal to actual damages. Given these assumptions, the paper concluded that liability rules always do




incentive to extort the victims for the following reasons. If, to avoid the
threat of not increasing his output from being carried out, the injurer
were to require that the victims as a class pay a certain amount of their
aggregate gains, then each victim would attempt to take a free ride on the
others' payments. The injurer, knowing that he would not obtain any-
thing in this way, would therefore presumably produce at q *and"allow"
the victims to keep their gains. Alternatively, the injurer might require
that each victim pay a specified portion of his gain in order for the threat
not to be carried out. In this case, a version of the holdout problem would
apply. Each victim would have an incentive to be the last one to pay,
believing that the injurer would not forego all of his potential gains in
order to get a fraction of that particular victim's relatively small gains.
Again, knowing this, the injurer would presumably produce a q* and
permit the victims to obtain their gains. Thus, when the entitlement point
is less than q ,itis possible to set liability greater than actual damages
and still reach q*. If the entitlement point is greater than q*, however,
the free rider problem applies and no bargaining will take place.
The combined set of (non-dominated) attainable outcomes is repre-
sented by the darkened line in Figure 4. Points on the profit frontier
between f,, and f" are achievable either by a property rule or a liability
rule. Points on the transfer line between f* and t. are attainable by





transfer line below t. are achievable by liability rules with liability
greater than actual damages.
Thus, when there is one injurer and many victims, liability rules do at
least as well as property rules. However, the first-best solution is achiev-
able by a liability rule only if it is on the segment of the transfer line
below f* in Figure 4. The size of this segment is determined by the tech-
nology of the externality and may be arbitrarily small.
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